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Introduction
Central Government has consulted on proposals for the implementation of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) in England. This paper provides a critical response to aspects of the proposed regulations of interest to those in the local economy. In essence a BID, following the American model, may be seen as the most focused initiative yet to bringing a range of stated benefits, with consequential financial burdens, to a particular local economy. The origin and evolution of BIDs is discussed by Levy (2001) .
It is the apparent success of BIDs in the American context (Mitchell 2001 ) that has prompted their introduction to England. There are several fundamental differences between the operation of the two. In America, BIDs are a private sector led initiative often starting in a voluntary manner, the levy being charged on property owners and not property occupiers. The proposed regulations for England will impose a compulsory levy and a remedy for non-payment should a BID be voted in. The occupiers of property in England will be identified by reference to liability to non-domestic rating, the fundamental unit of which is the hereditament, that is the particular area of property upon which an occupier is taxed. The tax (rates and additional rate for the BID) is paid by the occupier, although if the property is vacant, (depending upon its type and the nature of the property) a proportion of the full tax may be paid by the owner. This paper does not consider in detail the various reliefs and exemptions that exist although, undoubtedly, their fairness may come to be considered if BID proposals develop.
Fundamental to understanding the regulations and to appreciating their lack of transparency as they are currently drafted, is to understand what a hereditament is.
Hereditament
Hereditament is defined in the draft Statutory Instrument as meaning: What is meant by a hereditament is of fundamental importance as it is the unit of property which is subject to non-domestic rating. The definition of what is a hereditament is the same for both lists: it is merely that specified hereditaments 12 Draft Regulations 1(2) commenting on the interpretation of hereditament.
R (on the application of Edison First Power Ltd) v Central Valuation Officer and another [2003] UKHL 20
It may also be considered unreasonable not to ballot central list occupiers when at some point they may have a hereditament (being exactly the same in nature) that moves from the central list to the local list, as was the case in Edison.
Within the regulations, use is being made of a definition of 'hereditament' that is aimed at covering all rateable units. Yet percentage requirements for voting are only being drawn from the local list. Central list hereditaments are not individually described and their occupiers cannot vote. To vote in favour of a BID
proposal it is proposed in the regulations that there needs to be both a majority of occupiers of rateable hereditaments by number and by 75% by rateable value. It does not seem reasonable to exclude central list ratepayers of their hereditaments from voting and from payment without expressly stating to others that this is happening. Although it does not seem reasonable to exclude them from the democratic process if they should pay, if they are not to pay, the proposals will not cover all hereditaments 14 as is stated, and some justification for this exemption provided.
Occupation
The nature of occupation presents a further fundamental problem to the success of the proposals.
Prior to 1966, only occupied property that was rated. Since that date, provisions have been made for certain unoccupied properties to be rated, with the rating liability placed upon the owner. It is one reason why keep trading clauses can appear in a lease to ensure that the tenants trade to the end of a lease, thereby giving the benefit of the initial concession relating to empty property rates to the landlords when the property reverts to them 15 .
14 As in the Introduction provided by the Consultation Paper on the Draft Business Improvement Districts (England) Regulations 2004. 15 When a non-domestic property becomes empty it is generally the case that no rates are paid for the first three months, thereafter the rate is 50% of the occupied level. The benefit runs with the building and not the party charged. To complicate matters certain properties by use or designation (for example, industrial buildings, or Listed Buildings) are exempt from the payment of empty property rates.
There will in general be a provision in any lease to ensure that the tenant pays all rates and taxes due. This only relates to the term of the tenancy, although it is also common to find a tenant to be obligated to minimize, or at least not to increase, the rates and taxes during the term of the tenancy. It is therefore questionable whether tenant occupiers would be able to vote in favour of any proposal to increase a tax that could at some future time be paid by their landlord without being in breach of covenant. Those drafting leases on behalf of landlords may need to expressly address the matter in future.
It would be quite reasonable for a landlord to be hostile to certain BID proposals if the increase in the tax burden can be argued to reduce rents without bringing any value benefits. This argument would then be used against them when fixing a rent at rent review or in lease renewal negotiations.
Whilst a landlord may have reasons not to support the BID proposal, the same could also be true for a tenant occupier. If the result of the BID is so very successful as to dramatically improve the area in question, this can be expected to enhance both property capital and rental values. The tenant will in effect be contributing to an increase in the level of rent and rateable value (and therefore rates) in the future.
Symes and Steel (2003) comment on the paradox, 'more customers mean property owners will charge higher rents and small businesses in particular can find themselves priced out of an area'.
At present, there are no detailed provisions determined prior to any ballot to address clearly how occupied and unoccupied property is to be treated, in respect of both voting and payment. Given the complications and intricacies of Rating Law and the interrelationship with Landlord and Tenant Law, it may be that, if left to local BID bodies, some of them will devise proposals that may be subject to successful legal challenge.
It may also be the case that they develop proposals that are counter productive for some of the reasons noted above.
Poorly thought out procedures and administration have been identified as causing problems with a number of BIDs, for example the Madision Avenue and NOHO BIDs in New York. The problem with implementation in such circumstances is explored by Berman (1997) .
Are all hereditaments included in the rating lists?
At present, there is a duty on the valuation officer to maintain a correct local rating list 16 , but occupation and rate liability is calculated on a daily basis. Few people question whether the list is accurate in the sense that no one generally challenges omissions from it, save for the local authority that may make a proposal if on notification the Valuation Office Agency (VOA) does not do so.
There are however a large number of structures and erections in many areas that probably ought to appear on the local rating list but do not. Many structures and erections tend to be placed by local authorities and include covered cycle parks and the like. These local authorities are also responsible for notifying the VOA of their presence. The absence of a relevant hereditament from the list may alter either an aspect of the voting mechanism as well as resulting in something that is unfairly exempt from both rates and the BID levy.
New hereditaments are entered into the rating list following completion and there may be splits, mergers and deletions of existing hereditaments. Such changes to the list, which can occur some time after the change has actually been made, are back dated and back rates can be collected up to the effective date. Yet all these changes may occur to alter the position at the actual date of a BID ballot. The almost inherent inaccuracy of a rating list at a particular point in time, which is corrected later and back dated, cannot be foreseen specifically at the date of a particular ballot. There is the possibility that the ballot result would have been altered had subsequent changes to the list taken effect on the effective date.
Voting
It will be found that in a range of BID areas local authorities occupy a significant number of hereditaments and control as landlord, a reasonable number by value. In addition to the local authority, major shopping centre owners can be expected to control a large proportion of hereditament value within a given BID area.
There may be a concern as to the transparency of the democratic process on the part of smaller independent occupiers, especially if a voting turnout is low. These problems and concerns have been identified by Berman (1997) to be very real in the American experience.
In addition there is the problem of voting rights given to owners of unoccupied or exempt property, to those ratepayers benefiting from a concession or subject to transitional relief. The regime of rating in England is far more complex than the base position in America, or Canada which saw the first BID. Lengthy adversarial lawsuits have occurred in America and are commented upon by Symes and Steel (2003) and unless the voting position in England is transparent and clear lawsuits may follow in this jurisdiction.
Charities
The draft Statutory Instrument centres on the concept of the hereditament as a basis for a levy based on existing rating principles. The aim is to increase funding for a defined area for a defined purpose, or a range of purposes. At present not all occupiers bear an equal proportion of tax. Charities for example only pay a maximum of 20% of the occupied rates of others and may apply to the local authority for discretionary relief for the rest. The question is therefore raised in equity, is it fair that Charities should have the same voting rights as someone who will pay the full rate levy. Whilst if the levy is a percentage of rateable value rather than rates paid, Charities will see a greater increase in actual burden in percentage terms.
It may also be reasonable to ask a further question namely, should a local authority with a BID area operate discretionary relief on the remaining 20% of rates for Charities within this area? If they receive the full discretionary relief, they will be benefiting entirely from the supplementary contributions of others. To be fair and transparent, when any bid vote is taking place, the position of these bodies should be clearly identified.
To complete the consideration it would be appropriate to reflect adequately upon those buildings in a BID area that are exempt from rating altogether, and this would include derelict buildings and property used for religious worship. If they are to benefit from a BID proposal all interested parties should be made aware.
BID Area
It seems likely that certain central list hereditaments will fall wholly within a BID area and could be identified as such. Other central list items will cross a BID area boundary, for example, railway lines. This point will have considerable relevance if the definition of hereditament as appears to be the case, includes those items on the central list. To achieve its stated aim the BID area would need to be defined by specific reference to all rateable and non-rateable hereditaments irrespective of the list in which they may (or may not) appear.
American BIDs have on occasions given residents a vote for a small contribution, often one dollar, leading to complaints from businesses about the residents' voting strength. When residents have had no vote they have complained of 'taxation without representation'. The proposals for England do not propose to levy an additional sum on residents 17 . The residents will also not have the right to vote although the money raised from a BID will be spent in the BID area and this may benefit residents living within the area. Already in the proposed BID pilots for England we have seen in their development manipulation of the BID areas to include commercial hereditaments to be levied, and to exclude residential areas, which will benefit but not be levied. At least one Town Centre Manager drawing up the boundary for a BID pilot area has sought to include as many commercial hereditaments as possible; these will be levied if the BID is successful, thus raising more money. This is entirely reasonable from the Town Centre Manager's perspective. Residential units will not be levied therefore incorporating them offers no advantage to the BID area. We may see BID areas being driven by tax base (use) rather than being created by reference to local history or need, the regulations certainly encourage this.
In America it is recognised that the success of a BID area has led to pressure for the improvement of an Those more neutral to place like office or industrial occupiers may not benefit and the proposals may be divisive amongst occupiers. In England there will be compulsion to pay the BID levy; however the origins of the American levy are voluntary.
Conclusions
The rating system in England is having grafted upon it an American BID model to which it is ill-suited.
The American model is owner based whilst that proposed for England centres on occupiers. These occupiers may be voting for an area improvement that leads to an increase in the value of their hereditaments and therefore the rent that they may be required to pay. Would it not be better to levy the out of town occupiers and use the levy to strengthen town centres?
The wording of the proposed regulations is inconsistent with the commitment to levy the increased tax on all non-domestic ratepayers. Those ratepayers appearing on the central list have been omitted from the voting process and the levy in a manner that is not transparent or justified. This may be seen as unreasonable by those others being asked to vote and pay the levy, whilst those on the central list that subsequently move to the local list may complain that they had no say in the matter.
The voting and taxation provisions are not defined and transparent in connection with those paying less than full rates. The proposals do not adequately address those buildings currently exempt from rates in a BID area that will benefit from the proposals without being taxed at all. The proposals do not address an equitable treatment or transparency in voter knowledge of those benefiting from empty property relief, charitable status, discretionary relief, or transitional relief.
The regulations do not appear to recognise the Landlord and Tenant relationship and how it may develop to influence the success of a BID scheme that centres on occupiers rather than owners. The regulations lack clarity as to what rating list the figures are to be taken from given the proposed introduction of initial BIDs at the same time as a new rating list. The proposals also do not appear to recognise that the rating list is often subsequently altered or appealed and back dated to the relevant date.
These subsequent changes may have affected the outcome of an earlier vote.
The prescriptive nature of the regulations cannot be adapted to 'microfit' local conditions. Symes and Steel (2003) report the great strength of the BID system in America being that local businesses can tax themselves a little or a lot, monthly or annually, under various plans, and spend money to their priorities. 
